Kashmir Affairs - Security & Conflict Analysis of Kashmir

Special Report: Dead But Not Forgotten - Survey of Death Toll in District Baramulla 1989-2006

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Summary of Data for Baramulla District
One of the principal findings of our survey is that of the 5106 people who were killed in Baramulla District between 1990 and 2006, a disproportionately high number of people belonged to the age group 18-35. This is the age group that comprises the principal bread-earners, those who contributed significantly to their household income. Thus it was not just lives lost, but livelihood too that was taken away, leaving whole families in penury.
Total number of people killed: 5106
Males 4908: Adults 4557 Children 349 (i.e. those below age 17)
Females 198: Adults 156 Children 42 (i.e. those below age 17)
Civilian casualties: 2508
Militant deaths: 2267
Custodial murders: 408
Enforced disappearances: 343

It is notable that of the total of 5106 nearly fifty per cent (2508) were civilians and another forty four percent (2267) were militants. Age group of 18-35 years comprises 3634 deaths. Since adult women comprise about three percent of the deceased, males in the age group 18-35 clearly bore the brunt. If you add the militant deaths in the age group 18-35 years (1972) to those of civilians (1444), about 67% of all those killed are in this age group, suggesting that the age group 18-35 years, has been particularly targeted. The age profile of government forces personnel and renegades killed too corroborates this. Out of 273 people in this category, 209 belonged to the age group 18-35 years.

Custodial killings at the hands of government forces: survey figures indicate 408. Of these 205 are civilians, 197 militants and former militants, and the remaining six are renegades and others. This reveals the nature of state aggression and how it is managed. More than 50% percent of those killed overall, as well as more than 50% of those killed in custody are civilians: clearly, civilians have been seen as legitimate targets in the war against militancy. This deflates two myths. One, that the army only targets combatants. Two, that Militants have no support from local people. The fact is that the army has consistently conflated civilians and militants, seen them as one and the same thing. Civilians have therefore become ‘legitimate’ targets.

Enforced disappearances reported for the whole period are 343. Out of this 81 are militants or former militants while five belonged to government forces and 11 were renegades. However an overwhelming 72% (246) are civilians. The Indian government is clearly making use of enforced disappearances as a matter of policy in order to terrorize people. It is of course a tried and tested technique, favoured by other oppressive regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America, most notoriously in Argentina and in Chile under General Pinochet. The phenomenon is clearly not specifically targeted at combatants to qualify as anti militancy or anti insurgency operations. The figures overwhelmingly bear out that this war crime is perpetrated on an entire people. (The Indian government has often claimed that many of those disappeared have crossed the LoC for arms training, a claim that has been consistently contested by the families of the disappeared).

Occupational Profile
Almost half of all the male civilians killed in Baramulla District (2452) were moderately or highly economically productive people and more than a third were students.
Farmers: 1174
Skilled: 662
Professional: 532
Government employees: 84
Students: 989

Out of 2508 civilians killed occupational data for 112 was not available. In the case of 2267 militants killed the data is not available for 143. The survey, however, reveals that the dead belonged to all sections of the society: 55 different occupations were listed for civilians and 36 for militants. Respondents reported those killed as farmers, labourers, artisans, government employees, businessmen, milkmen, blacksmiths, mechanics, engineers etc. What do we make of this? Simply a confirmation of the fact that no section of the society remained aloof and/or unscathed by the war.

On the other hand data available for 2396 civilians and 2124 militants also shows that farmers comprise 626 of the civilians and 548 amongst militants. Among those whose occupation was given as labourers 221 were civilians and 166 militants. 364 civilians and 625 militants were reported to be students. It means that half of those killed (2540) were farmers, labourers and students. 189 civilians killed were businessmen, 205 government employees and 145 were artisans. (Some intriguing patterns were noted: among militants killed 269 were reported to be carpet weavers, a category absent amongst civilians killed. And 56% of all women killed (113) worked in their houses)

Educational Profile
The survey also shows the education profile of 4408 persons killed in Baramulla District, with 2695 literate and 1713 Illiterate.
Doctorates: 8
Islamic Studies: 9
Post Graduate: 35
Graduate and Under Graduate: 422
Matriculate: 932
Under Matriculation: 1289

Amongst the militants, a large number (691) were illiterate. Under matriculation were the next largest group (677) followed by matriculates (477) and those who had completed twelve class (229). Under graduate, graduate and post graduate were 36, 60 and 22 respectively. And there were two doctorates amongst the militants.

Similarly 1022 civilians were illiterate. Under matriculation numbered 621, matriculates 455, with twelve class counted at 195. Undergraduate and graduate civilians killed numbered 87. Only 13 were post-graduate while 6 had completed their doctoral studies.

Income Profile (per month)
Less than Rs 1000: 863
Between Rs 1001-2000: 1634
Less than Rs 5000: 503
Rs 5000 and above: 85

For slain militants, respondents could not provide the income profile of 738, while 414 were reported not to be earning members of their respective families. Another 425 reported monthly income of less than Rs.1000; 512 earned between Rs1001-2000 and 163 made between Rs 2001-5000 per month. Out of 2267 militants killed only 15 reported a monthly income above Rs 5001 and more.

What about civilians? In 686 cases respondents failed to provide any information on income and left the column blank while 352 reported no income. Thus 1038 out of 2508 civilians or 40% of the civilians killed had most likely no income. Those earning less than Rs 1000 per month numbered 438 and between Rs 1001 to 2000 were 622. Whereas 340 were shown as earning between Rs 2001-5000 and only 64 between Rs 5001-10,000. Only six deceased civilians earned more than Rs 10,000. So the overwhelming majority of 2098 civilians killed comprise those either with no income or less than Rs 2000 per month.

Profile of Perpetrators
Government forces: 2821
Militants: 417
Unidentified 1768

Out of the total 5106 people killed, the survey identifies perpetrators in case of 3337 deaths. But in a large number of cases in the survey (1768) the perpetrators remain ‘unidentified’. Amongst these 3337 cases, in 2812 instances, Indian forces were found responsible for killings. In contrast, the survey points out that, 417 killings were caused by militants and 108 deaths were ascribed to “cross fire”. Significantly, 1952 militants were killed by government forces and 910 civilians also died at their hands. But what of 1768 deaths caused by “unidentified gunmen”? A breakup of these deaths shows that 304 were militants, 1256 were civilians and 170 were members of government forces or its agencies, and 38 were political activists. Overwhelming majority of these killings (1236) by “unidentified gunmen” was by direct shootings. Three-fourths of them occurred in public view and a quarter inside the houses.

It is not surprising that the targeted killing of civilians started peaking alongside the rise of fratricidal ‘Ikhwani’ or renegade phenomenon in 1994. Ikhwanis were collaborative militants bought, armed and protected by the Indian army. They were then let loose on their own people. The phenomenon began getting formalised in 1994 although the diabolical process had started two years earlier.

Not surprisingly the survey registers that the year 1994 witnessed the highest number of killings attributed to ‘unidentified gunmen’. According to the survey, out of a total of 1768 people killed and ascribed to unidentified gunmen between 1989 and 2006, a bulk of 833 slayings were perpetrated between 1994-2000. This coincides with the emergence of the Ikhwani phenomenon. The Indian army’s patronage to the renegades was aimed at crushing the popular support on the one hand, while giving the Indian state plausible deniability for the crimes against an entire people.

In the prevalent situation the Indian state cannot be absolved of having attempted to eliminate and deter the public support for the fight against occupation through methods which escape and subvert any future legal recourse. In the ultimate analysis, the renegades, although a potent anti-insurgency force, ended up being used as human shields by the Indian army. The killings of civilians correspondingly declined with the systematic liquidation of the renegades by the rebel groups. By 2000, the renegades had also ceased to be a tactical tool for the Indian forces.

It is significant to note that whereas most of the deaths occurred in public places (even if they were the by lanes of a village), disappearances and large number of those shot dead by “unidentified gunmen” happened inside houses. According to the survey, out of 417 persons killed by the militants, 273 were government forces personnel and renegades. Internecine clashes claimed 76 militants, and 68 were either civilians or political activists. But it is interesting to note that out of these 76 inter-group killings, 57 occurred during 1991-1994. These internecine killings began to subside after 1994. Post-1998, the survey for Baramulla records no inter-group fratricide amongst militants.

The survey also reveals that out of total 2267 militants killed in Baramulla District, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) guerrilla group lost 1328 cadres, which is more than half of all militants killed. The group also bore the brunt of killings by “unidentified gunmen” in losing 130 out of 304 militants killed.

The year-wise break-up of the militants killed highlights that the years between1991-94 has also been the period of rising killings of militants: 142, 217, 299 and 354 respectively. Civilian killings too reveal a similar trajectory: 173, 247, 240 and 243 in corresponding years. In other words killings were highest during this period.

Out of 1545 encounters in Baramulla District, the same period (1991-94) also provides evidence of escalation in number of gun battles between militants and government forces: 98, 147, 200 and 244.

The likelihood of government forces, sent to crush a rebellious people, striking at anyone remains high. Given the very workings of counter-insurgency warfare (which is conducted among people), they become targets.

Government forces
A look at the death toll of government forces and renegades in the survey shows that 273 personnel were killed. Out of these 170 were killed by “unidentified gunmen”. Of these 105 were renegades and 59 police personnel. Assuming that all these 170 killings were carried out by the militants, the scenario throws up two possibilities. In the first place the total number of killings of government forces personnel at 273 is just about 5% of the total death count. And secondly, this death toll reveals that even among the government forces overwhelming majority of those who died were Kashmiris. Thus there is a form of double jeopardy that people experience in such situations. On either side, it is the local people who are the primary victims.

Most significantly, the survey highlights high incidence of killings through gun battles (1510), custodial deaths (408), direct shootings (1236), and cross fire deaths (108). These account for 3262 out of 5106 deaths or little more than 60 percent of all deaths. If enforced disappearances (263) are added to this figure, it reveals how this form of warfare is a “dirty war” in which brutal death is inevitable.

Consequently, out of 5106 people who died between 1990-2006 in Baramulla District, of which 4775 were civilians and militants, in nearly 90% of the cases the culpability of the Indian State is not only primary in that they caused it, but they are also the principal perpetrators of such deaths.

Acknowledgements
Studies and surveys undertaken as a collective work and based on voluntary participation of people, where only travel expenses can be met, are an exhilarating experience for the participants. But it is time consuming, and harmonizing pre-occupations of working for a living with availability of time for voluntary work can be confounding. There were also moments of tension and frustration because the work was taking too long to complete. But successful teamwork, once completed, is its own reward. The enthusiasm of team members and the process of learning inherent in such efforts is the reason why it is so.

This survey and our analysis are now in the public domain. We welcome criticism that will help us improve standard of our work and plug shortcomings that may be brought to our notice. Because the struggle for freedom for us also means a commitment to rigorously de-mystify obfuscatory politics, based on a denial of the essential truth that the struggle of our people is just and democratic. A struggle that is getting besmirched by the politics of slander and surrender.

We acknowledge our gratitude to the people of Baramulla who so readily came forward to talk to us. And who wanted to share so much more, which, given the nature of the survey, we could not honour.