Kashmir Affairs - Security & Conflict Analysis of Kashmir

Indian mindset. However, throughout the book he blames Pakistan for all the ills and problems of the Indian state - from Nagaland to Kashmir, a typical Indian response. In contrast, Raman is of the opinion that all the political problems and separatist violence in Pakistan are of her own making or a result of divine intervention, and that RAW has nothing to do with it. He refutes widely held beliefs about RAW’s involvement in fomenting trouble in Pakistan and its alleged support for Pakistani dissidents and politicians. He also mentions in passing Benazir Bhutto’s alleged links with the RAW and Nawaz Sharief’s relationship with an Indian actress. He wonders why Indira Gandhi did not try to solve the problem of Kashmir after the defeat of Pakistan in Bangladesh. He does not have a definitive answer, but comes up with a bizarre explanation that Indira Gandhi perhaps wanted to be generous with Pakistan. He goes on to make false deductions through imaginative invention, and tries to weave a Harry Potter story without the magic, abruptly concluding that “misplaced generosity should have no place in our relation with Pakistan.” [p.22]. His observations about the Indian and Pakistani intelligence agencies hounding each other’s diplomats indicates the high level of distrust between the two countries.

Raman makes sporadic references to Jammu and Kashmir and RAW’s various activities and role in blunting the resistance movement. He makes reference to a Europe-based Kashmiri leader who wanted to talk to India in the early 1990s, and although RAW facilitated his talk, according to Raman, “nothing useful came out of it.” [p. 36]. He also mentions his meeting with Farooq Abdullah in Geneva in the late 80s, in which Farooq Abdullah praised RAW and its founder Rameshwar Nath Kao for doing great work and teaching a lesson to Pakistan in 1971, and requested him to teach them a lesson again.

In chapter XVI, Raman states that the release of the JKLF militants in exchange of Mufti Sayeed’s daughter Rubaiya Sayeed in 1989 marked the beginning of widespread militancy in Kashmir. He also blames former Indian Prime Minister VP Singh for being soft with extremists and currying cheap popularity with the ‘terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir’. Raman reveals that, in order to contain the Kashmiri resistance movement, the RAW jammed Pakistani broadcasts and telecasts and set up mobile broadcasting stations to the people in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Northern Area. RAW was even involved in holding college examinations and special Kashmiri trade fairs. Such was its desperation that the RAW even wanted to organise arms training camps for the Hindu extremist group Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) in the Jammu area.

He mentions the Kargil War casually, since he had retired by that time. However, he fails to acknowledge that it was one of the biggest failures of his organisation. The last chapter makes a very interesting point on how India can use the Mirpuri community in the UK to counter Pakistani influence in Kashmir. Raman, while writing about Kashmir, cannot hide his anti-Kashmiri bias when he describes Pandits as ‘original inhabitants of the Valley’ suggesting that the rest of us are outsiders. This is surprising as he claims in the beginning of the book that throughout his career he was known as someone who didn’t show much emotion and was merely concerned with the work in hand.

Raman acknowledges that there is a structural bias against Indian Muslims in India’s secret service, as they are kept out without any appearance of this being the case. “The decision to keep out Muslim officers was taken by Sardar Vallabhai Patel, when he was the Home Minister of India after Independence. It was endorsed by Jawaharlal Nehru and all the Prime Ministers, who succeeded him, including Indira Gandhi when she was the Prime Minister.” [p. 131].

He writes briefly about the liaison between the RAW and the Israeli secret service Mossad, and claims that the contact was necessitated by India’s desire to develop counter-insurgency measures. “Shortly after the formation of RAW in September 1968, Kao [Rameshwar Nath, the founder of RAW], with the approval of Indira Gandhi, had set up a secret liaison relationship with Mossad.” [p.127]. He is critical of the US and its hypocrisy, saying, “the CIA trained the officers of the ISI in the use of terrorism against an adversary. At the same time, it trained the officers of the RAW and the IB in some of the techniques for countering that terrorism.” [p. 127]. He blames Americans and the CIA for fomenting Jihadi terrorism around the world, and criticizes British agencies for their role and involvement in Jihadi terror as well. He also claims that the slain Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini was favourable towards India and against Pakistan.

Raman remains in thrall to his own self-importance, and forgets his alleged reason for writing the book, which was “to break the reluctance in India in public interest, so that the nation as a whole may benefit from a well informed debate.” He suffers from a personality cult syndrome and heaps continuous praise on his former boss Rameshwar Nath Kao. He also seems to justify the actions of Indira Gandhi, while brushing aside accusations that she used and created RAW for her own political purposes. He even praises his colleagues for remaining “loyal to Indira Gandhi and her family” and seems to consider this a national duty.

The books fails to impress, because of Raman’s coarse style, unimaginative narrative, unintelligent language, passionless expressions and hardly any information that is not already available from open sources. There are typographical mistakes, boring details and recurring redundancies. Certainly a cow boy job!

November 2007

A hastily and loosely structured book, The Kaoboys of R&AW, is supposed to be a memoir of the former spymaster B Raman who spent 27 years working in Intelligence Bureau (IB) and Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). The book claims to be the first such memoir from an authoritative source in RAW - a highly secretive organisation that does not even come under the purview of the Indian Parliament. However, most of the information that is ‘revealed’ in the book does not offer any insight into the functioning of the organisation.

Raman is not a good story teller and lacks wit and imagination in reflecting his ideas and experiences. He does not seem to be able to rise above his ‘police’ background as he fails to appreciate the political and social realities and challenges facing India. His remedy for all the insurgencies born out of political stalemate seems the same as Hindu fundamentalists - a more powerful state response.

Calling the creation of Bangladesh the finest hour in the history of RAW, Raman ceaselessly celebrates it without offering any further details. He unwittingly admits that the RAW has remained Pakistan centric and failed to move beyond. “Over the years ...the R&AW’s assessments on Pakistan had proved correct more often than its assessments about Bangladesh.” [p.53]. In his chapter ‘Rajiv Gandhi and R&AW’ he describes the Pakistani mindset as an ‘enduring phenomena right from the day Pakistan was born in 1947’ while claiming that there isn’t any such