

Pakistan: Why A Nation is in Jeopardy Today

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As a nation Pakistan is confronted with the logical and orthodox contradictions. This maligns the idealism that is supposed to be Islamic State's special attribute. But while politicizing Islam for the nation building activity Pakistani leaders are neither able to uphold the secular nor sacred. On one side Pakistan has been trying to regulate (though with occasional restraint) the growth of orthodox enthusiasm of *Ulema and Jihad's* for true vision of Islamic state and on the other hand the State is unable to run the affairs with out Western standards of governance. Today it is in this inappropriate balancing of religion and politics that Pakistan is caught up with.¹

Now this contradiction seems to have become very mature and the grip of orthodox elements over the state has come more than half way through. At this juncture Pakistan can neither proceed forward to strengthen her democracy nor does it want to give in fully to orthodox elements whose linkages are very strong even at international level.

The variety of terrorisms that grew in Pakistan were also facilitated and patronized by the countries dictators and the so called democrats in connivance with the West and America. Be it her troubled relationship with India on the pretext of Kashmir question or the assistance rendered to United States during the Cold War -the countries institutions have followed a serious neglect. Her politicians have deliberately allowed the appropriation of their polity by Western Powers. It is the consequences of this appropriation that has brought the people of Pakistan face to face with the truth of unrestrained radical religious enthusiasm. The zeal for this may not be uniform among the majority classes of Pakistani society but it does uniformly impact majority of people in Pakistan.

Despite the bitterness and strain that dominated Congress and Muslim league relationship on the eve of partition Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, said on 11th August 1947 that our object should be peace within and peace without, we want to live peacefully and have cordial and friendly relations with our immediate neighbours and with the world at large. It is of vital importance to Pakistan and India as independent sovereign states to collaborate in a friendly way, jointly to defend their frontiers both on land and sea against aggression. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed-that has nothing to do with business of state. We are starting with this fundamental principal that we are all citizens and equal citizens of state now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and

¹ The classical example is that of Abul A'la Mududi the founder of Jamat-i-Islami who was patronized by state in mobilizing mob violence passionately against Ahmadyas in 1953 but when he went a step further to overwhelm the states policies for launching Jihad for liberating Kashmir, he was immediately arrested. Anita Weiss 1999. p.58.

you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in religious sense, because that is personal faith of each individual but in political sense as citizens of state.² Obviously Jinnah was not aware of the turns and twists that the politics of Pakistan was going to take after his death.

As a nation Pakistan was carved out on religious basis but religion as the basis of political ideology did not gel well with the practical functioning of politics within and out side the country. From the very beginning the Pakistani politicians always starved for a viable political ideology. They always depend on politicization of Islam and promotion of orthodoxy for evolving the integral personality as a nation and for legitimizing their position in international politics. As a result the politicians of Pakistan continuously struggled between the options of dictatorship and democracy and in the process they could neither strengthen their nationhood nor serve Islam.

Basically when Pakistan came into existence Islam was the most forceful factor for Politico-cultural revival at play in the world and it provided a completely different political and global vision from that offered by the globally dominant West and unfortunately Pakistani politicians were swayed by the tendency to patronize the politicization of Islam for their legitimacy. Humayun Khan very rightly observes that Pakistan's ruling elite in those days saw themselves as masters, or to put it more kindly, guardians of the masses in succession to the British.....In comparison, Pakistan's political leaders, unlike those in India, were not a product of a sustained freedom struggle, they lacked ability and in strictest sense, their credentials as representatives of people were, if not suspect at least out dated. Many of them had jumped on the Pakistani bandwagon rather late in the day and few of them understood the intricacies of statecraft in an independent country.³

Ignoring the fate of her citizens at that critical hour when communal carnage and partition had left millions in distress, Pakistan not only articulated the liberation of Kashmirees because of co-religionism in the neighborhood but the Muslim lands in Africa and the independence of Indonesia. Pakistan lent a great support for nationalization of oil resources by Iran and to the Egyptian struggle for withdrawal of British troops by sending twenty thousand volunteers to Egypt.⁴ Pakistan convened a world Muslim conference in february 1949 with the idea of reinforcing the spirit of Islamic brotherhood *umma* among the Muslim countries of the world and there was nothing wrong in doing it. But when Pakistan gave the idea of *Islamistan* based on economic and security alliance embracing all the Muslim countries and hosted conference devoted to international Islamic economic issues in 1949.⁵ As if it was not enough, Pakistan presented the idea of formation of Islamic bloc in the second *Motemar-i-Almi-Islamic* conference in 1951.⁶ This strategy of Pakistan was not digested by Arab leaders who saw British and

2 Burke 1957.p.55

3 Humayun Khan.2002pp.Xiv-xv.

4 Afzal. 2001.pp.82-86

5 Burke.op.cit.

6 Dawn October 1949 to july1951

American hand behind this scheme. They felt that the West was working out alternative to Arab league.⁷

When such a forceful and extensive Islamic revival was being carried out by Pakistan abroad, the Muslim countries like Egypt began to doubt the very credentials of Pakistan as facilitator of Islamisation. Liaquat Ali Khan the then prime minister of Pakistan and the chief architect of this Islamisation demagoguery in the Muslim world was assassinated in 1951. There after the whole political scenario changed speedily. Not only was her foreign policy viewed with suspicion by the West and America but even the Islamic countries showed disaffection for the kind of political attitude that Pakistan had adopted. Herbert Feldman very rightly remarks that Pakistan as a Muslim country had reasons enough for pursuing pro-Arab policy. The difficulty does not lie in reasons, but in the execution, which is marked by overemphasis on Islam that has proved injurious to Pakistan and irritated others.⁸

At home her programme for national integration and reconstruction also suffered immensely because of her dependence on Islam as the ideology of nationalism. The domestic situation of Pakistan during this period has been summed up very appropriately by none other than her first President Major General Iskander Mirza in his 1400 word proclamation issued on 7th October 1957 where in he stated, "For the last two years I have been watching a ruthless struggle for power, corruption and shameful exploitation of simple, honest, patriotic and industrious masses, the lack of decorum and the prostitution of Islam for political ends.....Adventurers and exploiters have flourished to the detriment of the masses and are getting richer by their nefarious practices....My appraisal of internal situation has led me to believe that a vast majority of people no longer have any confidence in the present system of government and are getting more and more disillusioned and disappointed and are becoming dangerously resentful of the manner in which they have been exploited."⁹

By this time the cold war had already set in. The Soviets were cautiously trying to gauge the mood of Pakistan. On June 8th 1949 the Soviet Ambassador to Iran formally extended the invitation to Liaquat Ali Khan through Pakistani Ambassador. A Soviet Trade mission also visited Pakistan. But before these negotiations and visits could crystallize any basis for future relationship, the West and America perceived the Islamic assertiveness as a serious threat.¹⁰ Soon they (British and Americans) discovered that the growing radicalization Islamic orthodoxy could be used for promotion and perpetuation of their hegemony and for countering the ideology and ambitions of communist bloc among oil rich nations. In such circumstances Pakistan appeared to be the most appropriate and strategic out post for assisting Americans in their cold war against Soviet Union in South Asia.¹¹ Being a superpower, America always twisted societies, economies

7 Dawn 15th April 1960 see also Javed Burki. opcit. p.304.

8 Herbert Feldman 1967 pp.2-22 and 45-56.

9 Proclamation, 1958, Wide Gazette, 31st October 1958.

10 Simon. 2002. pp.37-38.

11 Venkatramni. 1984. pp.111-12

politics and ideologies in order to ensure her strength in the world and Pakistan became the perpetual victim of their policy.

Pakistan's last hopes for Muslim support petered out about 1952, the same year that saw the election of a Republican administration in Washington (USA) that was anxious to complete the containment ring around China and Soviet Union. With the unwillingness of India to cooperate, an alliance with Pakistan seemed to be an ideal match. It was as a result of this that Pakistan's dependence on the West became inevitable particularly United States and United Kingdom. This alignment found expression in CENTO SEATO treaty groups.¹² It all started from 1953 when Ghulam Mohammad visited United States of America and rumours of Treaty of Mutual Defense taking place became public until then Pakistan pursued no affiliations even if there was a pro-West and anti- communist world view. Before 1953 Pakistan accepted point four aid which US President Truman had instituted within the frame work of Atlantic charter and aid through Colombo plan. It was during the Governor Generalship of Ghulam Mohammad that the domination of the Western diplomacy (USA and United Kingdom) in Pakistan's affairs came more than half way through. From then onwards Pakistan's foreign policy was always predominantly tutored by United States for her own interests and Pakistan is now paying the price for the aid and the military equipment that it got from United States from time to time in return for assistance in the cold war.

For controlling Pakistan's foreign policy the worst thing that Americans did was to bolster the prominence of a foreign threat particularly from India ¹³Initially even though President Ayub Khan had stressed friendly relations with her neighbours but neither did he exclude Islamic phraseology nor his appetite for siding with Anglo –American block from the elements of his foreign policy. On 25th December 1958 at Karachi in a brief of 150 words, Ayub Khan committed to United Nations charter abhorrence of colonialism and friendship to all Muslim countries. He said that the structure of our foreign policy is based on fundamental needs of our country. Pakistan started her foreign policy with certain initial disadvantages. If it is accepted that the principles which guide all relations between states are founded upon the necessity for preserving sovereignty, upon the defense of people and the soil, upon the protection of commerce currently accepted values, and way of life ,then the shape of any country's foreign policy sooner or later becomes plain So with Pakistan whose territories are divided and bounded, over great distances, partly by unfriendly Afghanistan and partly by India with which relations have waxed and waned in warmth and at all times, have been greatly complicated by the problems of Kashmir and river water. There was strongly felt intention and desire to pursue the faith and values of Islam, in concert with those other nations where the same belief prevailed.¹⁴

In April 1959 when Indian bomber was shot down in Pakistan, the Pakistani president counseled moderation. In 1960 this was reciprocated by the then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru by visiting Karachi and pledged to forget old rivalry/past conflict and

12 Herbert Feldman 1972 pp.90-95.

13 Karachi Dawn, March 25, 1959 and April 25, 1959. p.1.

14 Ayub Khan 1964 pp.195-209

signed Indus water treaty. Both the governments initiated negotiation about refugee property, payment of pensions, outstanding debts, trade, passport, visa and many other issues. But these developments were not appreciated by Pakistan's Anglo-American allies. Despite all these measures the Americans did not allow undermine the threat perception from India to be undermined because Pakistan's foreign policy was totally subordinated to diplomatic interests of United States. In October 1958 when coup took place in Pakistan, the new establishment did nothing to discourage American interference. On 5th march 1959 at Ankara a treaty called bilateral agreement was signed between Pakistan and United States, Turkey and Iran. In 1959 December President Eisenhower visited Pakistan and Ayub Khan visited Tehran and Ankara. Upon the conclusion of his Asian tour of 1961 Vice-President B. Johnson reported to his own President, through the letter John Fitzgerald Kennedy, as follows, "President Ayub, in Pakistan, is singularly impressive. He is seasoned as a leader, where others are not, confident and straight forward and, I would judge, dependable"¹⁵ United States gained confidence and the trust of Ayub Khan but Pakistani polity and diplomacy lost its integrity completely. Karl Von Vorys very rightly says that "otherwise Pakistan's Foreign policy lacked initiative. It was the tale of American kite."¹⁶

Because of United States dictation Pakistan made it implicit to oppose the communism from the day it allied with US. In his address to *Darul Uloom Islamia*, on 3rd May 1959 Ayub Khan said that while challenging communism that Islam should be retrieved from the recesses of the past and presented to world in the light and language of today. In his address at Dacca University's (now in Bangladesh) convocation 21 January 1960 Ayub Khan again stressed, "to modern slavery of communism there was only one answer and that answer was to be found in Islam." (Herbert Feldman. 1967.p.172) But in July 1961 when Pakistani economy was in shambles and Ayub visited United States and felt that America was reluctant to help Pakistan he suggested to United States that unless they gave fair amount of aid Pakistani economy will break down and inevitably lead to communism. Even though aid was a genuine need but bringing in the question of communism was a potent weapon for Pakistan to yield Americans

When Ayub Khan took certain independent steps to structure Pakistan's foreign policy the Americans and British expressed their disliking strongly. For example when Pakistan acquired 750 square miles of mountain peaks in her border treaty with China, the United States, State Department, expressed its displeasure and serious concern about the Pakistan's friendship with China. The agency for International Development suspended aid for enlarging the Dacca air field (presently in Bangladesh) which was to be the main air link between Pakistan and China at that time.¹⁷ While India's foreign policy was

15 Quoted in D, 17 June 1964 from William S. White's book, *The Professional*, a political Biography of President Lyndon B. Johnson.

16 Karl Von Vorys. 1941 p.163-66. Hebert Feldman observes that the first achievement of the Martial Law administration in foreign affairs was a moral one which the world quickly became satisfied that a firmer hand, disembarassed of profitless political strife, was in control. In this swift acceptance of new dispensation, which was recognized everywhere without hesitation, there was also, perhaps, an element of relief, for there was a time when Pakistan seemed to be degenerating into the status of Asia's sick man.

17 Dawn February 25, 1963 p.1.

establishing its own identity as a neutralist, self reliant and nationalist, Pakistan found only few opportunities to establish its own identity and independent thinking in the international arena. At times Anglo-American block deliberately gave the feeling to Pakistan that its Western allies were prepared to build up India militarily even though it would mean upsetting the already precarious balance in the region. Pakistan's Foreign minister Mohammad Ali called the Western military aid to India unfriendly act to Pakistan. West had a purpose and to spot light the friction between the two countries and keep the issue of Indian threat before Pakistani as a stick and occasional military aid as carrot. This justified United States deliberate effort to perpetuate the Military dictatorship in Pakistan and nurse it with religious orthodoxy which was actually meant for containing the advancement of communist ideology in the region and not for strengthening Pakistan against India.

As a result the free speech and democracy were perceived dangerous to the dictatorship in Pakistan because people would demand priority on social and developmental spending in order to improve conditions for country's poor. The United States instead persuaded leaders to know that they need a strong, contended military if they were to remain in power. Pakistan spent even more money, buying latest and most expensive weapons systems than required, to raise the regimes prestige. During cold war, under the United States pressure Pakistani government was made to lay the over emphasis on intelligence gathering for the defense of US activities which was portrayed as national defense. Pakistani dictatorship put a premium on information gathering that pleased them and discredited them which in course of time led to wasting of country's resources because there was a poor coordination. Under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Zia-ul-Haq, Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sheriff and General Musharaf, the government authorities carried out no legislation to this effect nor did Pakistani media or any organization criticize the government to curtail such behavior.

Each experiment of dictatorship or occasional democratic government in seeking legitimacy by assisting American establishment and by appealing religious sentiments of subjects went on strengthening the voices of fundamentalists and blurred the vision of Pakistan's institutions for modernity. It only suited to the interests of Anglo-American block so they remained silent about it. In sixties Pakistan was getting tired of United States dictation but they had no option and when Pakistan tended towards USSR it was too late because Soviets had lost trust in Pakistan and USSR raised the question of Pakhtunistan to remind Pakistanis that they were unwelcome to the Soviet camp. But the tendency to lean towards Soviet Union reflected the popular mood which found expression in transcending to democracy under Bhutto -though only for the brief interval and to the great disliking of United States.

When finally Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his Pakistan Peoples Party replaced Ayub Khans Martial Law regime with a populist political ideology that he characterized as "Islamic socialism" but so far as the domestic and international politics was concerned he discovered that all the institutions were very deeply attracted to Muslim ideals of power

and authority as evolved and grown by Martial Law in connivance with Anglo American block, so much so that he could not initiate any effort towards their reorganization. Despite his efforts to portray the viability of new phraseology of Islamic socialism, people suspected his rhetoric and his 1977 electoral victory over the conservative Pakistan National Alliance. It landed Pakistan in such a crisis that Pakistan easily reverted back to Martial Law (military regime) under General Zia –ul –Haq.¹⁸

When Zia ul Haq took over as dictator his publicized *Nizam-e- Mustafa* plan was different from Islamisation Programmes of previous governments.¹⁹Zia appeared to be more rooted in the native culture. Eventually he issued directives to government departments for *Nimaz* during office hours to be led by department heads. All business centers were obliged to close for Friday prayers. A committee was set up to revive the Islamic institutions of *zakat* and *ushur*. Islamisation of banking system in Pakistan was carried out. *Hadud* punishments were introduced for drinking theft, dacoity and adultery. Zia discouraged co-education but encouraged chard closed garments for women. A *sharia* faculty was established at the *Quaid-i-Azam* university in Islamabad, the council of Islamic ideology was empowered to make recommendations as to measures for bringing existing laws into conformity with the Quran and the *sunnah* (the sacred tradition in rule or *custom*)and the Islamic research institute was entrusted with the task of conducting research in Islam. Steps were taken to revise text books and curricula. The poor flocked to *madrasas* which gave them food and shelter the television and radio were ordered to redesign their Programmes according to the Islamic teachings. United States was happily watching these things because it suited them. With the eco of Iranian out cry of *musalman-e-pakbaz* the unwanted Muslims were eliminated and persons known for their commitment to an Islamic order were appointed to key government posts. According to Turkkaya he exhausted all of his political cards, including Islam, to legitimize his rule.²⁰

Infact all the measures Zia adopted were not motivated by his moral clarity or genuine interest in strengthening the institutional foundations of state by religious idealism but he wanted to wash his blood stained hands after Bhutto's execution and to help United States to organize much needed Afghan Mujahedin movement in Pakistan and Afghanistan against Soviets. The process of building Afghan Mujahedin movement in Pakistan and Afghanistan against Soviets by CIA and ISI led to the integration of Terrorism into Pakistan's foreign and security policy so much that it is very complex for any military or democratic establishment to deconstruct that integration particularly when the situation is not as war demanding as it was before collapse of Soviet Union.²¹ When Pakistani government felt that her citizens were finding the Islamist message attractive it gave the impression that it was on the same side.

Although Zia-ul-Haq's own version of Islamic polity Bhutto's legitimized execution but it did not resolve the main dilemma concerning the essence of Pakistan's Islamic

18 Shahid Amin.2000.P.56.

19 Tanzil-ur-Rahman Islamisation in Pakistan, Islamabad council of Islamic ideology 1964.

20 Turkkaya 2001 p.90

21 Arne Westad.2007.pp.340-372.

nationalism. Instead Zia-ul-Haq was left with no option but to make more and more concessions to fundamentalists. As a result his effort to make Pakistan a truly Islamic State and define her nationalism in terms of Muslim identity resulted in a making situation so much complex that all those, (among orthodox or modernists) who were genuinely interested in development of Pakistan got totally disillusioned. Mazhar Ali Khan very rightly says, “The process of Pakistan’s political degradation began long decades ago; however, in its last phase General Zia ul Haq worked with special devotion to destroy national institutions, emasculate political parties foster political corruption, and pervert accepted political values. The legacy he left behind him included a half baked political system and gangs of caretakers who remained determined to serve their benefactor’s mission of not allowing democracy to prosper in Pakistan.....repeatedly the cover of Islamisation has been used to make the plan for regression palatable. This is certainly no service to Islam, which is viewed by the people and many eminent scholars as the foundation for democratic egalitarian society.”²²

But behind the scene was the Carter administration. To the national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided much welcome proof aggressive intensions of Soviet Union in the third world. In his report to Carter on the day of the invasion Brzezinski noted that, “both Iran and Afghanistan are in turmoil.” and the age long dream of Moscow to have direct access to Indian Ocean was in the process of being full filled.²³ “it was Brzezinski’s portrayal of Brezhnev’s Afghan policy as a naked act of aggression and as a first step in challenging US positions in the gulf area that won Carter over to seeing the Soviets as implacable enemies and the invasion of Afghanistan as the gravest threat to world peace since 1945”.²⁴

In spite of the Presidents sense of shock and outrage, the invasion in no way came as a surprise to Washington. US intelligence-both air surveillance and intercepts-had shown Soviet forces being readied for action in Afghanistan since late November 1979²⁵. United States had also begun a programme of direct financial and material support for the Afghan anti-communist opposition in July 1979, which was stepped up as the year progressed. By early September Admiral Stanfield Turner, Carters director of central intelligence had asked for several “enhancement options.” to be worked out, including one that would provide funds for Pakistanis to purchase lethal military equipment for the insurgents and a like amount of lethal equipment ourselves for Pakistanis to distribute to insurgents.²⁶We must remember that each of these experiments with Islamic dictatorship

22 Mazhar Ali Khan1998pp..419and487.

23 Brezhnev to Carter 26th December1979.

24Frank Reynolds.1980.p-328.

25 It is stated that when the national security council met to discuss US counter measures, the US president surprised even his national security advisor by supporting all the proposals that were on the table, including the a prohibition on US grain exports to Soviet Union and a boycott of 1980 Moscow Olympics, both measures that would do little good to the embattled presidents chances of re-election. But for Carter, the need to get back at the soviets and as he saw it, deter further Soviet aggression was a stronger than even his political survival skills. He said, “Soviet actions over the next ten to twenty years will be coloured by our behaviour in this crisis we should try to do the maximum, short of a world war, to make Soviets see that this was a mistake. Record of NSG meeting, 2nd January1980NS Arch,Carter-Breznev collection.

26 Robert E. Gates From Shadows; The ultimate insider’s story of five Presidents and how they won the cold war New York Simon schuster1996 p.147.

or democracy in Pakistan only strengthened the voices of fundamentalists and blurred the vision of countries institutions for modernity. But it suited to the interests of Anglo-American block and since they were its silent sponsors.

But the US planning was soon overtaken by events in Afghanistan itself. In February 1980 barely six weeks after the Soviet invasion, Zbigniew Brzezinski's went to Pakistan, where he discussed about the expansion of a covert action programme with General Zia and visited Afghanistan frontier where he was photographed waving a Kalashnikov rifle roughly in the direction of border line.²⁷ "On his way home Brzezinski stopped in Saudi Arabia, where he agreed a Saudi matching contribution for the Mujahedin to any thing the Americans would provide. Well before Carter had been defeated by Ronald Regan in the US Presidential election in Afghanistan could and should be made into a Soviet Vietnam."²⁸ By this time a number of new US programs to counter radical communist regimes in third world were well under way including Yemen, Angola and tiny Caribbean island Grenada.....The beginning US offensive in Islamic world became much easier because of the Muslim reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan Moscow's decision not only made many nationalist regimes turn against it-the Islamabad meeting of 35islamic nations in January 1980 condemned "Soviet military aggression against Afghan people" but it also de-legitimized the left and made it easier for Islamist agitation to find an audience in middle east North Africa, even in Muslim South east Asia. For many Islamists, especially new recruits to the cause²⁹ "The Soviet Union and Communism became the main enemy and the united states a tactical ally in deed, if not in word. For the Saudis, the US support for the Afghan Mujahedin was essential. The head of Saudi general intelligence department Prince Turki-al-Faisal told CIA allies we do not do operations we do not know how all we know is write checks."³⁰

For Pakistan's military leader General Zia ul -Haq, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan implied both opportunity and threat, though the former out weighed the latter. Zia believed from very early on that the intervention meant a chance to let the Islamist movements that he sponsored become the internationally supported Afghan opposition.³¹ It also meant that Pakistan, in the eyes of the United States and Britain could shed the stigma it obtained with Zia's coup the execution of his civilian Predecessor Z.A.Bhutto and the burning of US embassy in Islamabad by local Islamistsin1979.In other words, Zia could have it both ways he could full fill his dream of directing a *jihad* and receive Western support.

While doing so Zia's plans were greatly helped by third world condemnation of Soviet invasion as did non-aligned movement during its meeting of foreign ministers in new Delhi in February 1981. at which a Pakistani-sponsored resolution was passed over a much milder Indian version.³² Within the Muslim world Iran and even Libya-not

27 Arne Westad.2007p.329

28 Record of NSG meeting,26 december1979 NS Arch ,Carter-Brezhnev collection.

29 Arne Westad.2007p.390.

30 Arne Westad.2007p.390.see also Stve Coll. 2001 pp.72-73.The prince is referred as generous friend of anti-American causes.

31 Ibid.P-351

32 Cold warp.352

generally considered friendly to Zia's regime-were willing to cooperate with him in support for the Afghan Mujahedin.³³ (Within Pakistan Zia left the organization of the support for the Afghan Islamists, and for more than 1.5million refugees who lived in the camps on the Pakistani side of the border, to the head of military inter-services intelligence ISI General Akhtar Abdur Rahman. General Akhtar an old classmate of Zia's graduating with him in the last class of the British Indian military academy before independence and known for his hatred of India and for his dedication to the concept of Jihad. The system of supplies and political control that Akhtar built put his own organization at the center, with Saudi Arabia and United States as the main funds, and Egypt and China as the main deliverers of Soviet type weapons. Akhtar also organized training camps for the Mujahedin, giving pride of place to recruits from Hikmatyar's *Hezb-i-Islami*. The instructors in these camps were Pakistani's though American and British Personnel were in place to train Pakistani officers in the use of the newly acquired weapons. From 1984 onwards the CIA helped run training centers for Afghan and Foreign Mujahedin in Egypt and probably also in at least one of the Gulf States. Reportedly, General Akhtar visited the latter, but did not generally approve of these camps, since they took recruitment and training in these camps away from his supervision.³⁴ Until 1983 United States kept within the framework of aid to the Mujahedin established by Carter administration. This meant that washing ton paid for small amounts of weapons and other supplies that came to the Afghan resistance through third countries.

The American aid distributed through Pakistani agencies –was considerably less in total during the first two years of the conflict than that paid for by Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. Both the State Department and CIA still held relations with Pakistan to be too cool to envisage a major American effort through that country. There was also a considerable resistance in the bureaucracy, especially at State, against confronting Soviets too directly especially since no body seemed able to come up with a concrete plan of how any ore extensive American involvement would figure out. But most important of all was the firm belief in the CIA and intelligence organizations across the western world that Mujahedin could not over time inflict serious casualties on Soviets. Investing in Afghan resistance would be a losing proposition. It would be far better to spend money and effort in re-establishing a relationship with Pakistan and thereby shore up the struggle against further soviet encroachments in the region.³⁵

Arne Westad remarks, "Getting to know the general and his administration took lot of money aian1981 the United States provided Islamabad with six year 3.2billion economic and military assistance program, including the delivery of forty F-16 jet Fighters.³⁶ A US National Security Intelligence estimate passed in November 1982 found with a certain understatement that the US Pakistani deal on economic aid and weapons sales undoubtedly has strengthened the Pakistani International position and restored some of its self confidence." During his visit to Washington the General. Zia pushed for more,

33Zia's speech 3rd June 1980 to the nation published as Islamic order as our goal Islamabad directorate of films and publications ministry of information and broadcasting Govt. of Pkistn1980.

34 Arne Westad.2007pp.350-390.

35 Elie Karakowski,Milton Bearden and Nicholas Veliotes 2002

36 Secretary of state to US Embassy, 1982

including a tacit US acceptance of Pakistan's Nuclear weapons program. Even though both Reagan and Shultz warned against any development of nuclear weapons the secretary noted to the president that they must also recognize how we handle nuclear issue can have a profound effect on our ability to continue to cooperate with Pakistan in supporting the Afghan freedom fighters. In pursuit of further American aid General. Zia not only subtly stressed his strong attachment o china and hinted that the Chinese remain faithful to their policies and agreements.”³⁷

For Pakistan and ISI the increase in aid to Mujahedin was a God sent opportunity. Since the major proportion of aid was distributed by Islamabad so Zia claimed credit for it and there by formed the political shade of Afghan opposition almost at will. As General Yusuf the head of ISI Afghan Bureau put it, “the CIA would arrange and pay for shipment to Karachi notifying us of Arrival dates once the vessel docked the ISI took over storage and distribution. The ISI made sure that it was the Islamist movements and especially Hikmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami that received most of the aid especially of new weapons. By 1986 the battle Zia had already begun to believing that Soviets would have to withdraw sooner rather than later and that the battle for post communist.”³⁸

When the news of air crash killing of Ziaul Haq, was disclosed to the president Ghulam Isaq Khan he consulted his senior colleagues to get their consensus to support and strengthen his presidency in accordance with constitutional provisions. But whatever recommendations were made to President, the part of the process included over emphasis of defense of Islamic values³⁹. Although Benazir genuinely wanted to move Pakistan towards democratization but her political campaign was mostly dominated by Kashmir issue. The posters dotted entire Pakistan with the slogan ‘*Kashmir Banega Pakistan.*’ Such designs consistently preserved the false consciousness of masses who wanted to move towards a more secular political terrain. It encouraged those in the army establishment who firmly believed that Pakistan did not deserve democratic polity because of their ISI was too much intertwined with CIA Under all dictatorial regimes Pakistan created elite units in army through ethnic interests. That is why at present or in near future if any organization in Pakistan enlists the support of jihadis can also take over Pakistan because the Pakistani military has although been taught to be sympathetic to radical Islam which was outer cover of the states political ideology. Since Pakistani army worked in connivance with CIA. The later's primary motive was to enlist success against Soviets in cold war and use assistance of Pakistani army in realizing their ambition. As a result Pakistan followed a serious neglect both in her domestic and foreign policy. Pakistan was made to patronize radicalization of Islam for building the scaffolding to restrict the spread of communism. It was in this process that Pakistan failed to explore the other tools of legitimacy as a nation state other than politicization of Islam which suited to Western and American interests at that time. Before 9/11 US did not deter Taliban from waging conflict or pressuring India when hijacking of Indian plane took place to Qandhar.

³⁷ Arne Westad pp.350-390

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Mazhar Ali Khan 1998pp.419-487.

During Musharaf's regime also Pakistan replicated the Arab influences in order to extend their influence by relying on more indirect methods including propaganda, terrorism and use of surrogate clients such as *Al, jihad, Alfaran* etc. A renowned Kashmir analyst, Murtaza Shibli very rightly remarks, "The proverbial trio of Pakistani politics-Allah, Army and America seem to have been reconfigured in reverse order with Americans enjoying on the top. The US influence is so powerful that they virtually seem to be running every aspect of Pakistani Life as allowed by General Musharaf in his last years of rule. They are said to have an acknowledged military basis, secret prisons and torture centers with powers to detain Pakistani citizens and thousands of secret agents running around in the country without any legal or bureaucratic fetters. This is the main reason that Americans are against the reinstatement of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhary who was adamant in upholding the law and wanted to know the fate of thousands that have gone missing in Musharaf's regime with many of them ending up in secret American prisons and torture cells. The majority of the Pakistanis see the US war on terror the main reason for problems in tribal areas and resultant suicide bombings. Speaking at Kashmir rally on 5th February 2008 in Lahore, *Jamat-i-Islami* leader Liaquat Baloch castigated president Musharaf for acting as tool in the hands of Washington to make Pakistan a failed State as per US agenda."⁴⁰

From all these details it becomes amply clear that during the cold war there has been consistent radical Islamist orientation in south Asia. In this Pakistan was tutored and patronized by America and suddenly from 9/11 Pakistan is forced to give up what it has grown as part and parcel of her political personality at the hands of her politicians and the US even though such a policy has denied Pakistani nationalism the much needed firm foundation. Now even if the Pakistani State is trying to transcend to democratic norms that may not suddenly change things at the fundamental level so quickly because Pakistani army has to get equipped with qualities that are part of modern fighting forces and such an openness, trust and respect at all levels. Even now Pakistan continues to face a major domestic crisis because of the possibility of collapsing of military force and the presence of NATO forces in her immediate neighborhood. The factionalism of domestic politics has crept into the ranks of Pakistani army. Pakistan is discovering now that US military supplies to Pakistan were not without influencing her policies and politics from the very beginning of cold war.

The country is thrust into a situation with its neighbours which can be characterized an era of no war and no peace in between. Neither her use of arms nor her negotiations with India or America have provided solution to Kashmir problem. Her real sympathy for Kashmiris on religious grounds diminished once for all when the Kashmiris were subjected to worst suffering in the recent past. Pakistan is not understanding that by and larger the efficacy of terrorism in fulfilling the political goals of any regime has failed. Either those countries using terrorism have faced international isolation or sanctions and other punishments.

For some regions terrorism must have worked as a logical political strategy to achieve their goals aiming at social revolution or nationalist movement but for Pakistan

⁴⁰ Murtaza Shibli. 2008. P.9.

particularly in Kashmir's case it has grown hatred and the dehumanization that was carried out in Kashmir in the process. This strategy is no more seen in Kashmir heroic, successful, inspiring for masses to support it. Today a sizeable section among Kashmiris are reluctant to be dragged into conflict worried more about internal threats than about Pakistan's proposals for their political future. During the struggle thousands of people died, lots of resources were wasted, economic development was almost arrested and living standards were held back. Kashmiri intellectual life was crippled. Militancy brought no freedom but more quarrels, splits and inter-group conflicts. India was not expelled from Kashmir; nothing good came out of it except decades of suffering and turmoil. The much prophesied revolution and freedom did not take place at all. Recently President Zardari characterized them as terrorists.

In fact Pakistan government has no incentive to end Kashmir conflict even if Kashmiris do not want that. But it helps the Pakistani government to hike military budget to ensure domestic stability by coercion. Even the state sponsored terrorist pressure or violence that is used against India as a conscious integral strategy of her foreign and security policy has not helped Pakistan at all. Instead it has virtually shattered Pakistan's economy. The end of cold war has penalized Pakistan that is why the region has become riskier place in the world.

The inability of the religion to play a major role as a political ideology into nation's politics can largely be attributed to the ethnic/tribal diversity found within in Pakistan. Jinnah and Ayub Khan may not have been able to eliminate religion as a factor in politics, but the leadership of religious parties has also not been able to make Pakistan a sectarian state. Interestingly India patronized and promoted the linguistic and cultural diversity to strengthen the foundations of her nationhood. I think the basic mistake that Pakistan did was to continue radicalization of Islam as the basis of nationhood. Particularly in an area where more than 57% of countries territory is inhabited by people belonging to different ethnic and tribal cultures and these groups always subordinated their religious loyalty to their respective ethnic and tribal loyalties.⁴¹ Dubbing NWFP with too much of terrorism is also viewed with suspicion that Pakistan is containing opposition in these areas under the pretext of eliminating terrorists while the real camps are elsewhere in her territory.

The main dilemma that has confronted all the rulers of Pakistan since Ayub Khan, is that, since 1958 the justification of Pakistani nationalism has been the ideal of an Islamic state, an essential basis of legitimacy in order to overcome all the ethnic divisions that compartmentalize the population yet the very idea of Islamic society is more divisive than it is unifying because there can be no agreement as to what the Muslim is they way they treated Kashmiris, *Baloches*, *Shias*, *Ahmadyas* and Afghans.

All neighbours of Pakistan would love to see the country fully transcend to real democracy, whatever it is worth, but even this time the transition to democracy may also end up as a brief interval that her history has occasionally seen in the past. With the end of cold war the Anglo-American block has not lost its appetite for political intervention in

⁴¹ Gardezi & Rashid 19830 pp.94-158.

the country's politics though after cold war the impression of some of the strategic analysts in South Asia was that the country has been used by America as a toilet paper during the cold war era and in return small bounces that trickled in the shape of military and other aid packages, have not helped the country to base her institutions and economy on firm footing. The country is in serious trouble and the politicians are either feigning innocence or deliberately shutting their eyes to reality. Pakistani people do not want conflict but the institution of their army can not survive with out that hence the struggle between her armed forces for perpetuation of dictatorial regime and people's aspiration for democracy has the immense potential to tear Pakistan apart.

Pakistan's diplomacy is virtually in shambles. On one hand it is can not continue the alliance with United States that is viewed by radical Muslims not only in Pakistan but all over the world as unholy but on the other hand after 9/11 Pakistan is also suspect in eyes of world. Pakistan has nothing to transact in foreign policy today therefore if Pakistan continues her involvement in terrorist activities in India or elsewhere that clearly illustrates Pakistan's frustration because of her domestic instability and external isolation and if it continues with same attitude such outcomes may not be welcomed for long and will have awesome consequences for the stability of Pakistan itself.

The issue that should deeply concern Pakistan is the sharp divide between public opinion and public policy which has been increasingly growing as a result of states unwillingness and inability to protect her citizens from violence. Unfortunately that is the mature sign of failed state. This will spell the end of even whatever symbolism of democracy Pakistan has embraced. The stable Afghanistan is needed by Anglo-American block to thwart Russians designs. Afghanistan's emergence is viewed by Pakistan as a strong threat but with United State it is a historical necessity and inevitability. Pakistan is made to cooperate much against her wishes in stabilization of Afghanistan's victory for Anglo-American block is a far fetched thing because of many reasons rooted in strategic complexities of the region.

Pakistan can not act sincerely in her structural transformation if it continues to support US designs in the region when US is suspect in the eyes of Muslims at popular level. With out committing herself to true democratic values Pakistan is speedily submerging internationally under the weight of her own mistakes and when Pakistan should realize that Peace, stability and economic development are more desirable ends than an end less struggle to facilitate the realization of US ambitions will amount to posing great risks to the Pakistan's survival as a nation.

Pakistani leadership needs to understand that in 21st century if their nation state has to embrace modern democratic and administrative principles in totality they may not be consistent with the ideals of Islamic state because so long as populism rests with fundamentalists, the power to people would mean subjection of state power to fundamentalist forces or ethnic fragmentation of communities that constitute Pakistan. The state needs to deconstruct the politicization of Islam that results in false glorification ideal of Islamic state, props up the expectations of orthodox thinkers about the government's policies to change socio-economic scenario. If we separate political culture

from theology we are sure to find consensus among people whatever the nature of their ethnicity or level of orthodoxy because true Islam stands for translating individual virtue into community power. The different groups may differ as to the characterization of good but they will surely agree that personal qualities are always effective in influencing the public .The true Muslim is one whose glance is enough to change the fate of world for good not for worse. All the leaders and followers need to keep in mind that they are bound together because of Allah's will for an orderly social world of believers and treachery with people in and out side the country is supreme evil that too for petty political reasons.

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