Kashmir Affairs - Security & Conflict Analysis of Kashmir

India-Pakistan ‘Peace Process’ and Kashmir

Murtaza Shibli

June 2008

Introduction
The past sixty years of India and Pakistan’s existence has been defined by their dispute over Kashmir – a ‘space of desire’ over which Pakistani and Indian nationalisms collide; both claiming it to be an integral part of their territory. This bitterness has ensued through long spells of the Cold War, cold peace and the four wars that have divided Kashmir across the Line of Control (LoC) with the majority of territory with India ; and Pakistan and China controlling two-fifths and one-sixth respectively. There have been many attempts in the past to break the deadlock, but due to political considerations and trust deficit aided by various geo-political configurations, not much progress was made. Although the India-Pakistan relations had not reached a ‘hurting stalemate’, the aftermath of 9/11 seemed to have created the ‘ripe moment’ for a peace process. In light of new geo-political realities, Pakistan not only had to give up its military assistance to the Kashmiri resistance fighters, but also to abandon its support for the UN Resolutions that called for the right to self determination. Similarly, India had to accept that it cannot crush the Kashmiris through military means and had to abandon its ideas of launching a war against Pakistan under the pretext of ‘War on Terror’ or ‘cross border terrorism’ as a means to pacify Kashmiri rebellion.

The stated aim of this peace process reflects the ambivalence of economic concerns pushed by the neo-liberal economic agenda, but there are other reasons and motivations as well. Primary among them being the realistic thinking pushed by the overt nuclearisation that the outcome of any military engagement would be uncertain and hence disastrous for both sides. Also the peace process is being pursued with an aim to gain international influence and legitimacy as both the countries try to portray a liberal and peaceful image abroad.

If Kashmir gave rise to wars and acrimony, it has now prompted the two countries to start a peace process that is deemed as ‘irreversible’. This has resulted in a greater movement of people across the two regions with the talk of allowing trade and further easing control in order to make current borders ‘irrelevant’. Though the Kashmir problem is far from being solved, the thaw that the ‘peace process’ has ensued is allowing India and Pakistan to discard past political linkages and revive old and shared historical and cultural links. The main argument of this essay is that Kashmir is central to the India-Pakistan relationship, but as the new linkages are formed and historical and cultural roots of the past revived and strengthened, the core Kashmir problem is slowly moving towards periphery. The cooling of tempers on Kashmir has allowed both the countries to pursue profitable engagements in trade and commerce, which is in turn pushing Kashmir to further margins. However, I further argue that this optimism cannot be self-sustaining unless the Kashmir issue is addressed and solved comprehensively as there still remains a large trust deficit, particularly in the security arena. Amid the talks of peace and business, both countries continue to spend massive amounts on defence and routinely carry out nuclear capable missile tests, signifying that the peace process cannot reach maturity and erase chances of future confrontation unless the core issue of Kashmir is solved.

History
India and Pakistan have a long history of conflicts and wars since 1947. They have fought four wars – 1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999. All but the 1971 war was fought on Kashmir and it is widely believed that the Kashmir problem is the ‘major cause as well as effect of the tensions between the two countries’ (Puri, 2008:100). The massive public rebellion and insurgency in Kashmir in the late 80s pitched India and Pakistan against each other not only at the popular political level, but ideologically also, raising the mutual mistrust and hostilities to unprecedented levels. This is not to deny that there have been ‘over 100 pacts, joint communiqués and agreements between the two countries.’ (Ahmad, R;2006:10), with resolution to ‘the Indus Waters dispute in 1960 and the Rann of Kutch dispute in 1968 through negotiations, [but] there was no agreed mechanism to navigate their enduring conflictual relationship.’ (Misra, 2007:506).

The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the end of the Cold War necessitated a change in thinking. While ‘there was a discernible plunge in US interest in Pakistan on the one hand and growing warmth in relations with India on the other’ (Misra, 2007:508), India was also increasingly willing to negotiate with Pakistan as it had failed to crush the rebellion in Kashmir despite engaging more than half a million troops. Besides, ‘the conventional wisdom that one cannot chose neighbours and therefore must learn to live with them had begun to shape India and Pakistan’s foreign policy formulations.’ (Misra, 2007:508).

Taking the lead, the Pakistani government led by Nawaz Sharif initiated dialogue that saw the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries meeting for the first talks in three years in April 1997. The meeting was described as friendly although ‘Kashmir topped the list with Pakistan insisting that Kashmir is the core of their problem and must be addressed first, but India contended that because Kashmir is the toughest issue, it should be dealt with later so progress can be made on easier matters’ (CNN, 1997).

A marked shift in the relations came when ‘in May 1997, in Malé, capital of the Maldives, on the sidelines of South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit, Indian Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral and his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif mooted the idea of a structured dialogue or the CDP [Composite Dialogue Process]…Based on a compromise approach, the peace process enabled the two countries to discuss all issues including J&K [Jammu and Kashmir], simultaneously. In other words, the peace process discarded the ‘ Kashmir first’ approach and followed a ‘middle-path’ wherein progress on all issues was possible simultaneously. It was a compromise in the sense that India agreed to include Kashmir in the agenda for talks, Pakistan relented to include terrorism, the two major irritants in bilateral relations’ (Misra, 2007:507).

The dialogue process was itself a great achievement and warmed up the mood, but it could not go far due to a weak Indian government. A political crisis ended the government, and in March 1998, the Hindu fundamentalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which was known for its anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan rhetoric, came to power, raising tensions. Barely a month in office, in May 1998, the new government conducted five underground nuclear tests, destroying any trust that was built since the Malé meetings. The crisis brought years of nuclear competition into open with the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee making loud and hostile remarks that India needed nuclear weapons to prevent what it called ‘military adventurism by…Pakistan’ (CNN, 1998). The Indian Home Minister LK Advani also said that ‘ India intended to adopt a ''pro-active'' military policy in Kashmir , including ''hot pursuit'' of Pakistan-backed insurgents operating across the cease-fire line (Burns, 1998.b). This was followed by a series of statements by various Indian leaders that were ‘read as threatening a military attack on Pakistan ’ (Burns, 1998.a). The Indian statements were so provocative that it looked as if a war was imminent. ‘India's Ambassador to Pakistan was summoned to the Pakistan Foreign Ministry to be told that Pakistan intelligence agencies had picked up signs of an imminent Indian attack on Pakistan's nuclear installations’ (Burns, 1998.a). Finally, when Pakistan retaliated with its own nuclear blasts and claimed to have ‘evened the score’, the Indian officials continued their provocative speak. ‘Some official [Indian] statements belittled Pakistan's first tests...India's Defense Minister…described Pakistan's blasts as ''Ping-Pong balls,'' crude atom bombs of the kind the United States dropped on Hiroshima, not the more powerful and sophisticated hydrogen bomb that India said it detonated’ (Ibid.).

The nuclear blasts attracted huge international condemnation and economic sanctions. After initial jubilation, there was a security rethink as the previous policies with unilateral security framework became untenable (Hussain, 2006:410). The growing calls in both countries stressed the need to move away ‘from a confrontationist approach towards a policy of engagement and address pending disputes in a peaceful and negotiated manner’ (Misra, 2007:508) in order to achieve assured mutual survival. Therefore, when Nawaz Sharif while announcing his country’s nuclear blasts offered talks, India accepted the offer and the Indian leaders had to tone down their rhetoric. This culminated in Atal Bihari Vajpayee taking a bus journey to Lahore in February 1999 that resulted in the Lahore Declaration that stressed for a peaceful and bilateral resolution of all the problems.

However, this optimism turned short lived ‘as Pakistan Army provoked escalation in Kargil along the LoC as they along with Kashmiri resistance militants infiltrated into Indian positions. This led to a war that took place between May and July 1999’ (Puri, 2008:100-101). Although the international pressure forced Pakistan to abandon Indian positions, it effectively buried the dialogue process with Vajpayee famously saying that his Lahore bus was dumped at Kargil. The Kargil episode reinforced two things: sanctity of the LoC that was in India ’s favour and Kashmir being viewed as a nuclear flash point and hence calls for its resolution. This went in favour of the Kashmiri resistance and Pakistan .

In the aftermath of Kargil, the Indian government hardened its position and categorically refused any dialogue with Pakistan . This led to a stalemate that continued for nearly two years. In order to clear the hostile air, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, in summer 2001 ‘proposed a “reciprocal action plan” to New Delhi as a first step to diffuse tensions between them and to promote peace. While calling upon India to stop atrocities in India-held Kashmir, it said “ Pakistan might recommend to the freedom fighters to moderate their indigenous freedom struggle in Kashmir ”’ (Hussain, 2007-08:7). Owing to the international pressure, Atal Bihari Vajpayee invited Pervez Musharraf for talks to Agra in July 2001. Although the summit failed ‘to produce a tangible outcome, but the draft Agra Declaration that both sides considered issuing at the end of their historic meeting clearly stated that “settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir issue would pave the way for normalisation of relations between the two countries”’ (Ibid.). However, the failure of the summit added to bitterness with the Vajpayee government, under the pressure from Hindu fundamentalists, upping the ante and accusing Pakistan of sponsoring terrorism and hence ruling out any talks until the ‘cross border terrorism’ was stopped. Pakistan responded by calling an end to the Indian ‘state terrorism’ in Kashmir .

9/11 – ‘The Ripe Movement’?
The immediate aftermath of 9/11 was one of uncertainty for Pakistan as it was deeply involved in Afghanistan and felt threatened for its own survival. Initially, India was hoping to draw the world attention towards the Pakistani involvement in ‘cross-border terrorism’ as ‘right wing agenda of national security, nationalism, anti-Pakistan/Muslim sentiments...acquired a new legitimacy’. (Singh, undated: 1). The Indian Defence Minister even accused Pakistan ’s indirect involvement in 9/11 and in veiled terms called for the US military action against it (Excelsior, 2001). But as Pakistan took a U-turn and joined the ‘War on Terror’ against Taliban, Indian expectation for the Western support for its own military campaign against Pakistan proved futile. Pakistan also failed in its attempts to seek Western support for Kashmir in lieu of its joining the War on Terror. In the ensuing confusion, the Kashmiri resistance militants also increased their activities to keep the international focus on Kashmir converged. The alleged militant attack outside the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly in early October 2001 raised tensions and the Indian government threatened to attack and destroy ‘terrorist camps’ inside Azad Kashmir in Pakistan . As the US was trying to cool down the tempers, alleged terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament in New Delhi in December 2001. The Pakistani or Kashmiri involvement was never proven, but the attack provoked the Indian government and it ‘launched its biggest ever peacetime mobilisation of forces on Pakistan ’s border called Operation Parakram’ (Puri, 2008:101). Pakistan responded with its own troop mobilisation and, in May 2002, war seemed like a distinct possibility. ‘Faced with the nightmare scenario of an India-Pakistan shooting war turning into a nuclear conflagration – with devastating consequences for the region and the American anti-terror campaign against Al-Qaeda – Washington exerted intense diplomatic pressure on New Delhi and Islamabad, asking them to pull back from the precipice’ (Hussain, 2006:410).

In June 2002, after months of brinkmanship, both the countries agreed to pull their troops back. While India realised that there was not much world support for its own ‘war on terror’ and ‘hot pursuit’, Pakistan had to come to terms with the changed worldview and abandon its support for the Kashmiri militants as well as linkage politics – linking solution to the Kashmir problem with its progress in relations with India. Pakistan’s then Foreign Minister, Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri described the shift as ‘confrontational mode of the subcontinent being rolled back in the face of ground realities of today’s turbulent world’(Ahmad, S; 2007). This could perhaps be described as what Zartman (2006) calls the ‘ripe moment’ which in this case was created by the active influence of outside powers, particularly the US . This ‘ripe moment’ advanced the constituency of peace and strengthened it at the cost of those who sought a perpetual confrontation for either their personal or ultra-nationalistic goals.

New Phase of the Peace Process
‘A new era of peace began...after Pakistan declared a ceasefire on the LoC in November 2003 and India reciprocated. It was followed by talks between Vajpayee and Musharraf on the sidelines of the SAARC conference in Islamabad in January 2004 when the two leaders agreed to start a composite dialogue on all contentious issues, including Kashmir’ (Puri, 2008:101). President Musharraf pledged that ‘he would not permit any territory under Pakistan ’s control to be used to support terrorism in any manner. This statement was meant to mollify New Delhi ’s concerns relating to the issue of alleged “cross-border” infiltration from Pakistan ’ (Hussain, 2006: 412).

Since its resumption in February 2004, the India-Pakistan ‘composite dialogue’ commonly known as ‘peace process’ has had four rounds with preparations for the fifth round under way. Both the countries have made some Kashmir specific measures like cease-fire along the LoC that has brought relief to thousands of villagers on both the sides, as well as allowing greater movement of people between the divided regions including leaders of both the parts of Kashmir .

The latest dialogue has been described as ‘the most vibrant epoch in India-Pakistan détente’ (Matoo et al, 2007:vii) that is different from previous engagements. Many have termed the process as ‘irreversible’, as it has withstood terrorist bombings of July 2006 and of the Samjhauta Express in February 2007. After the Samjhauta Express bombing in which more than 50 Pakistani civilians were killed, Pakistan refused demands to freeze talks saying that it would be tantamount to falling into the trap of terrorists. This has strengthened the feeling that India-Pakistan relations have matured and the dialogue process has reached ‘a level of self-sustainability’ (Ibid, viii). In a sense, the peace process has shown its irreversible character as it has continued through various changes in the governments in both countries- from a Hindu fundamentalist BJP government to a secular coalition led by the Congress party in India ; and from a military dictatorship to a broad based secular democratic government in Pakistan .

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