Kashmir Affairs - Security & Conflict Analysis of Kashmir

India-Pakistan ‘Peace Process’ and Kashmir

Murtaza Shibli

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Motivations
Although ‘India and Pakistan did not seem to have reached a mutually hurting stalemate which is regarded as a key element in conflict resolution theories, and pushes parties into negotiating a compromise solution’ (Misra, 2007:507), there are many motivations for both the countries to lower their hostilities and engage in a peace process. The economic liberalisation and overt nuclearisation exhibited the deficiencies of their respective positions and 9/11 not only crystallized those anomalies, but also proved a convenient façade for a change. This followed ‘a significant increase in the numbers of analysts, academics, research scholars and policy-makers in both countries who have argued that all issues can be resolved through peaceful negotiations and not by coercion and confrontation. Viewed in this way, the peace-process was indispensable for both sides’ (Ibid.:509).

The overt nuclearisation prompted first serious calls for engagement; from ensuring mutual survival to ‘display responsible nuclear custodianship’ (Hussain, 2007-08:8). The threat of a nuclear war made a military solution virtually impossible, as the outcome of any such engagement was uncertain and unpredictable. This was proved in the Kargil War beyond doubt when India could not escalate due to the fear of provoking an all out nuclear war and Pakistan had to vacate Indian territories for fear of the same. Mukerjee’s (2006) idea that the uncertainty of military outcome makes peace harder to achieve does not hold true in the India-Pakistan case. In fact, uncertain outcome of any military engagement seems to have contributed to a rethink to strengthen non-military mechanisms like trade and open borders to seek reconciliation. Due to strong international condemnation for initiating the Kargil War, ‘ Islamabad feels obligated to reassure the world community about its nuclear weapons and growing missile capabilities. Resumption of India-Pakistan dialogue with its focus on nuclear risk reduction measures seems to be the only credible way of easing world concern over the safety and security of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal’ (Hussain, 2007-08:9). Similar argument can be extended to India , as it seeks recognition as a new world power and wants to exhibit its responsible behaviour.

The Track II diplomacy has also contributed in changing the political climate. There have been several non-governmental initiatives under way where former diplomats, retired civil and military officials, journalists and other members of civil society have interacted to develop the concept of cooperative peace and security. Mohanty (2008:15) points out that ‘cumulative impact of track two diplomacy’ has played an important role in effecting a change. However, more credence is accorded to economic changes like increased trade and cooperation between China and India that reduced the importance of mutual border disputes, prompting Pakistan to follow suit. ‘As India’s ties with the US, China and other major countries grow impressively, its rise as an Asian power drives Pakistan to settle its disputes before the power asymmetry grows any further’ (Misra, 2007:525). One of the reasons for the change in the mindset is ascribed to the economic liberalisation, vision of creating the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) and consequent economic opportunities (Mattoo et al, 2007:viii). In the 1990s, both India and Pakistan liberalised their economies; and because the world economy is driven largely by the dominant neo-liberal agenda, this agenda seems to have had great influence on the thinking in both countries. The high business interest in the initiative is not only for the immediate economic reasons and the development of SAARC but also for the belief that enhanced geo-political stability would attract more foreign investment. In case of Pakistan , the added incentive to pursue peace is the common belief that it would lead to liberalisation, secularisation and democratisation of their society (Selby, 2007:2).

Although both the countries have taken recourse to liberal functionalist reasoning as their main motivation for engagement, Selby (2007:21) believes that the peace process is ‘a product of both India and Pakistani quests for international influence and legitimacy. In India ’s case, support for negotiations arises primarily from an awareness that conspicuous conflict with Pakistan damages India ’s global political image and ambitions. Pakistan ’s participation in the peace process, meanwhile, is driven primarily by post-9/11 pressure upon the Pakistani regime to end its support for terrorist groups and by the latter’s need for enhanced international legitimacy’. Above all there is a realisation in Pakistan that ‘there are links between the continuation of dispute, the rise of Islamist extremism in the country, and the threat that the groups espousing Jihad as a state policy pose to the country’ (Burki, 2007:25). This has reinforced the belief that both the countries face similar problems such as ‘terrorism, poverty, ecological and environmental problems, religious extremism…[and] both countries now have a joint anti-terror mechanism to chart out way and means to fight terrorism’ (Matoo et al, 2007:viii).

Kashmir - From Core Issue to a Peripheral Symbol?
There is no doubt that Kashmir has been the most outstanding problem between the two countries, but political realism and economic concerns seem to have reduced the issue in its importance or at least its symbolic value; thus decreasing its power to hold India-Pakistan relations as ‘hostage’. Although, there is no actual progress on the future of Kashmir, the peace process has progressed and India and Pakistan have strengthened their cultural and trade links, slowly pushing the core issue of Kashmir to the margins. ‘Movement of people and goods between the two countries have increased manifold, in an unprecedented manner; myths about the other are gradually vanishing; the leadership in both countries is identifying common grounds to engage themselves in; and, the unstoppable forces of a rapidly changing world are forcing the countries to think out of box. This may indeed be the opportune time for creating a common vision for a common destiny…’ (Matoo et al, 2007:viii). The commonality that is being invoked relates to centuries old shared history, culture and geography which is also used to build a case for trade within regional arrangement ‘as a way to develop the Kashmiri economy and to create pressure for peace on both sides of the border’ (Burki, 2007:26). Therefore, it is argued that as the current ‘Peace Process’ is progressing, it is gradually demystifying the ‘coreness’ of Kashmir as India and Pakistan are actively moving to other areas of agreements and forming new relationships.

This was evident in the February 2008 elections in Pakistan which ‘were fought almost wholly on domestic issues...[with]…marginal attention [paid] to issues like Kashmir…All major parties, contrary to the past, mentioned Kashmir only in the concluding paragraphs of their election manifestos…[and] there was no sloganeering about grabbing Kashmir’ (Ahmad, 2008). The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) that emerged as the largest political party ran ‘open minds, open markets, open opportunities’ (PPP, 2008:6) as its slogan and promised to make Pakistan a business friendly country (Ibid.). ‘Besides hailing the China-India model of conflict-management, the PPP in its manifesto also stated that it would not allow lack of progress on one issue, namely Kashmir, to impede progress in other areas of common concern with India’ (Ahmad, M; 2008). The PPP also reiterated to ‘work for a regional economic framework for the countries of South Asia to benefit all its people through economies of scale. Such a regional economic group has the potential to turn into a global economic powerhouse, attracting investment, creating jobs and eliminating poverty’ (PPP, 2008:20). The first policy statement of the PPP head, Asif Ali Zardari, was on similar lines when he suggested freezing the Kashmir issue for future generations adding that it should not be allowed to hold India-Pakistan relations as hostage (Dar, 2008; Subramanian, 2008). The same thinking was reiterated by Pakistan ’s new Prime Minister, Yusuf Raza Gilani who stated that Pakistan would not fight another war with India for Kashmir . Similarly, former Prime Minister and leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) also supports peaceful relations with India and is considered as ‘pro-business’ politician. Pakistan ’s Foreign Minister, Shah Mahmood Qureshi who stressed that the new government would not put on hold progress in various areas of cooperation with India because of the impasse on Kashmir . He said that ‘there are areas like trade where we feel we need to move on to the mutual benefit of both the countries’ (Greater Kashmir, 2008). This stems from the well articulated belief that trade could be used as a glue to bind together the splintered region (Burki, 2007:35-36).

Such thinking also reiterates that the power of Kashmir to hold the polities of two countries as ‘hostage’ is on the wane as they are moving to a ‘constructive engagement towards fulfilling common regional goals and aspiration’ (Mattoo et al, 2007:viii). This new regional approach of holistic South Asia is freeing both India and Pakistan from their narrow geographic and attendant political considerations over Kashmir . This was also evident from the fact that India did not react at all to the rhetorical ‘Kashmir statements’ by some Pakistani politicians during and after the elections, a departure from the past when every ‘Kashmir statement’ from Pakistan was matched in tone and content.

The ‘cultural exchange’ that led Indian and Pakistani journalists, retired diplomats and singers and cultural performers to visit Kashmir has seen new levels of popular engagement, though it has evoked strong resentment among the sections of people and politicians who are worried that Kashmir is being pushed into oblivion. Despite the earlier feeling that the new Pakistani government might change course of its Kashmir policy, the engagement between the two countries has continued on the previous lines and visits of Pakistani artists continue to push for further peace. The recent visit of famous Pakistani rock band ‘Junoon’ received huge public interest with youngsters enjoying the musical performance. This is despite the fact the supreme commander of biggest Kashmiri resistance group Hizbul Mujahideen had called for scrapping the event which was rejected by the organisers and performers.

Problems and Pitfalls
So has the ‘peace process’ transformed Kashmir from a malignant pathology into a benign problem that is on wane? Will it be eternally drowned under the new optimism of mutual booty of trade and commerce or shared culture and jingles of commonly revered maestros? If the history of the region is an indicator, then the answer is a big no. Between every war from 1948 to 1999, Kashmir had been forgotten or sidelined with the hope that the dust of history will settle the malefactor. But Kashmir keeps on coming back with vengeance, nursing wounds and provocations ad infinitum. As the two rivals are now nuclear armed, even the very thought of Kashmir ’s comeback prompts scary scenarios. Although both the countries affirm to resolve the issue peacefully and via political means, there is clear lack of any serious initiatives. In India , there is ‘no consensus at the national level….in terms of a final solution. The existing Parliamentary Resolution signifies Indian’s maximalist position and not what is feasible and practical….There is a clear difference between secular moderates and the extremist Hindu right in India’ (Chandran, 2007:4). The situation in Pakistan is no different, as the Musharraf regime never consulted any political parties while dealing with India . To offset this, some people in India and Pakistan believe that as trade and commerce grows, the border dispute in Kashmir will subside citing the China-India example. The PPP and the new Pakistani government seem to subscribe to the same idea (Ahmad, 2008; Greater Kashmir, 2008). Those making such comparisons fail to recognise the most important fact that there was no political movement or constituency embedded in China-India dispute as there is in Kashmir . The Kashmiris have a history of 60 years struggle against the status quo with Indian and Pakistani interests intertwined with it, both at the official and popular level, making it harder to neutralise such a profound sentiment through economic initiatives alone.

There is no denying the fact that mutual trust levels have gone up and so has the ‘people-to-people’ contact and trade, but the security concerns remain unchanged. Under the clamouring for peace, we cannot remain oblivious to the fact that ‘military spending has increased sharply in recent years, and weapons tests have continued unabated (indicatively, India and Pakistan ’s recent resumption of talks was accompanied by both states conducting high-profile tests of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles)’ (Selby, 2007:21). In realistic terms, this means that there has been negligible meaningful progress on core issues, thus reducing the peace process to a charade where the whole process remains pretence, largely for international consumption (Ibid.). This position is shared by the majority of Kashmiris who have not noticed any tangible difference on the ground - be it the spate of human rights violations or overwhelming presence of the Indian Army, despite massive decrease in the levels of violence. There is a general feeling that while Pakistan and Kashmiris want conflict resolution, India wants conflict management. This attitude might be prompted by this belief of Indian elites that ‘a much stronger India in the next eight to ten years would be less vulnerable to bullying (italics mine) and pressures’ (Misra, 2007:525). If this is what drives the current Indian behaviour in Kashmir , it is a very risky trajectory to follow. Kashmiris are well aware of the dangers as the former Indian Minister of State for External Affairs and the President of the largest pro-India Kashmiri political party, National Conference, Omar Abdullah, warned that ‘freezing Kashmir without finding a solution would prove dangerous not only for India but for Pakistan as well.’ ( Kashmir Times, 2008).

In Kashmir , the initial optimism about the peace process has died down long time ago, with the Kashmiri leaders - both pro-Independence and pro-India questioning the rationale of the exercise for its lack of any visible impact on the ground. The pro-independence Hurriyat Conference led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq that had held several rounds of talks with the Indian government over four years, pulled out of talks in late December 2007 declaring that India was not sincere. One of its senior leaders, Nayeem Khan openly admitted that dialogue process with New Delhi had cost them their credibility as India was unwilling to make any changes on the ground. Similar observations are made by many Pakistani political and religious parties with renewing calls for Jihad, citing unending human rights violations as one of the reasons (Gardezi, 2008). Therefore, ‘the peace process remains highly vulnerable to Indian and Pakistani political whims that have always been inconsistent’ (Mohanty, 2008:15) and ‘there is still a long way to go before history’s legacy can be overcome’ (Burki, 2007:31).

Conclusion
The current peace process has created a favourable atmosphere for trade and commerce reinforcing old and mutual links, pushing Kashmir to the periphery. But it has yet to reach to the levels of ultimate trust as both the countries have failed to build a consensus on the Kashmir issue and its ultimate solution. Despite increased economic activity and people to people contacts, the security concerns remain and are reinforced by the arms race and introduction of new nuclear capable technologies. Unless the Kashmir issue is seriously addressed, the claims that the ‘peace process’ is a pretence for international consumption will stay and gain ground, stripping it of any legitimacy and goodwill. Such a negative view is already holding ground among Kashmiris because there is a massive Indian military presence that is prone to commit human rights violations. Therefore, it is necessary for both the governments to attend to Kashmir and seek its resolution. The current atmosphere of trust and good will could offer some help to expedite a breakthrough. But if the business of finding a solution is left unfinished, the change in geo-political situation in future might make pursuit of war more gainful than that of peace and therefore lead to another cycle of acrimony, hostility and tension.

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